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# GREAT BRITAIN AND THE RACE PROBLEM IN PALESTINE

by

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## THE BASIC CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

SINCE the Palestine riots of 1929, when a period of intense racial bitterness and religious excitement culminated in a series of murderous attacks by Arabs on Jews, accompanied by looting, burning and wanton destruction of property, the moral conflict which underlies life in the mandated territory has lost none of its urgency. Of late it has even been intensified as a result of record-breaking Jewish immigration in 1933 and 1934 traceable to two unrelated circumstances—the growing prosperity of Palestine since 1932 and the desperate plight of German Jews since April 1, 1933. This marked increase in Jewish immigration led in October 1933 to Arab demonstrations and riots, and has since caused continued unrest as the influx of Jews has shown no signs of abating and funds have been raised abroad for the settlement in Palestine of more refugees from Germany.

The Jews, who have suffered acutely for two millennia from the spiritual, physical, social and economic disadvantages of homelessness, are determined to make good use of their present unique opportunity to re-establish themselves as of right in their ancient homeland. Legally their case rests on the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, issued while the British were still campaigning in Palestine against the Turks. Anxious over the outcome of the World War, the British sought by this declaration to win wider and more active support for the Allied cause in Jewish circles. They undertook, in accordance with a project which had

gained many adherents in England in pre-war days, to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status of Jews in any other country. France, Italy and the United States endorsed the Balfour Declaration. It was also embodied in the preamble to the Palestine mandate, eventually receiving the consent of all states members of the League of Nations.

The success of the Zionist movement, however, depends not on foreign aid but on forces inherent in world Jewry itself. The Jews believe that their extraordinary success in preserving a separate racial consciousness through so many centuries, in spite of wide dispersion, presages a destiny truly appropriate to a gifted people. An entirely new perspective is created for them by the fulfilment of an age-long religious hope in the return to Palestine and the escape from an unproductive struggle with uncongenial and often hostile environments. The creation of a self-contained, self-directed Jewish society living in Palestine as of right, and not on sufferance, means an opportunity for the Jewish genius to express itself once more without extraneous limitations.

At the outset, Zionist leaders developed a number of efficient organizations to select, train, transport, settle and maintain Jewish immigrants, to raise funds for Jewish enter-

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prises, to acquire and develop land, and to provide educational and health facilities of a higher standard than those generally prevailing in Palestine. Prices paid for land were high and initial expenditures on groves, stock, buildings and modern equipment for agricultural colonies were heavy. These charges were borne, however, by Jewish organizations rather than the individual colonists. Jewish industries, on the contrary, were undertaken chiefly on private initiative. The Jewish Agency,<sup>1</sup> appointed under the terms of the mandate to advise and cooperate with the British administration in matters affecting the Jewish National Home, protected the interests of world Jewry in relation to Palestine.

Despite many vicissitudes, Jewish enterprise has progressed until it far exceeds anything foreseen at the turn of the century by founders of the Zionist movement. The Jewish population of Palestine has increased from 65,300 in 1919<sup>2</sup> to a total of about 225,000 in 1934. The enterprise is no longer as fully dependent on benevolence as in the past. It has entered on a phase in which private initiative assumes an important rôle. As a result an extraordinary development has taken place in Palestine, so that an intense economic activity distinguishes it today from other territories under Class A mandate.

Palestine, however, is a small country of approximately 10,000 square miles, much of it arid and apparently unfit for cultivation and the rest already populated. Arab inhabitants deny that they are under any moral obligation to evacuate the country in favor of the Jews, or to make reparation to the latter for sufferings imposed on them through the centuries by European persecutors. For thirteen hundred years Palestine has been part of the Arab heritage, and the Arabs do not wish either to be crowded out of it or to be relegated to a position of social, economic or political inferiority. They bitterly resent their disfranchisement since the World War, and the fact that responsible government, granted in other Arab territories under mandate, has been withheld from Palestine. They denounce Great Britain and the League for using a superior military power to force on them an alien invasion, in whose interests their own normal political development is obstructed.

Before the World War Arab-Jewish relations were generally complacent. Thus on January 3, 1919 the Zionist leader, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, and the Emir Faisal, who subse-

quently became King of Iraq, signed an agreement which foreshadowed a régime of friendly cooperation between Palestine, seat of the Jewish National Home, and an independent Arab state, which the British had offered the Arabs as a reward for their revolt against Turkey. The Arab-Jewish agreement was contingent on the actual creation of the Arab state, as the Emir Faisal pointed out in a reservation to his signature.<sup>3</sup>

The Allies, however, failed to satisfy the ambitions they had previously encouraged among the Arabs and imposed on the Near East a settlement which seriously obstructed the peaceful development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. They divided the land-bridge between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf into five mandated territories under French and British administrative control. The Arabs felt that they had been betrayed. To accomplish the renaissance which was their principal object<sup>4</sup> they determined to fall back on their own resources, dissipating none of the assets still left to them after four centuries of Turkish domination. In the case of Palestine, they refused to recognize any measures which might interfere with its inclusion in a future Arab state, rebuilt on the ruins of an empire which in the Middle Ages had enjoyed a position of leadership in scientific and philosophical thought.<sup>5</sup>

The handicaps of the Palestinian Arabs were obvious. Retarded as a result of centuries of neglect, unprepared for competition with enterprising Jewish immigrants from the West, separated by new boundaries from communities with which they had formerly been politically identified, they resorted to a policy of non-cooperation. A series of seven Moslem-Christian Arab Congresses popularized the views of political leaders serving on the Palestine Arab Executive, which refused to recognize the legality of the Balfour Declaration or the mandate, organized strikes, demonstrations and boycotts, and kept up a general agitation against the Jewish National Home.<sup>6</sup> Race riots occurred in 1920, 1921 and 1929.

Zionist leaders maintain that the establishment of the Jewish National Home will not harm the Arabs, that it will bring them a wide variety of advantages associated with

3. For text and reservation, cf. *The Palestine Post*, September 24, 1933. For text of letter from Faisal to Professor Frankfurter indicating a friendly welcome to Zionists in Palestine based on the hope of an Arab state, cf. "Contributors' Column," *Atlantic Monthly*, November 1930; also W. E. Hocking, *The Spirit of World Politics* (New York, Macmillan, 1932), p. 355-56 and 541-43.

4. For an account of the Arab nationalist movement, cf. Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1929), p. 266-318.

5. For an opinion, seldom advanced publicly, that the Jewish National Home is not incompatible with the inclusion of Palestine in an Arab federation, cf. Norman Bentwich, *Palestine* (The Modern World Series, London, Benn, 1934), p. 289.

6. For an account of Arab political activities, cf. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (London, Routledge, 1932), p. 138-47.

1. Since 1929 the Jewish Agency has been equally divided between Zionists and non-Zionist Jews desiring to cooperate in the establishment of the Jewish National Home. For a review of Palestinian affairs prior to 1929, cf. Elizabeth P. MacCallum, "The Palestine Conflict," *Foreign Policy Association, Information Service*, October 16, 1929.

2. *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1921, p. 1353.

the machine age and the development of scientific research, improve their health, raise their standards of living and keep them in touch with the modern world. The Executive of the Jewish Agency has stated that one of the bases of its policy is the adoption of "active measures in the economic, social and political fields with a view to bringing about peaceful relations and a rapprochement between Jews and Arabs in Palestine on the principle that, whatever the numerical strength of either people, neither shall dominate or be dominated."<sup>7</sup> Arabs regard these utterances with contempt, seeing in them merely the propitiatory gesture of an invader whose ultimate purpose is to deprive them of their home. They contend that, although Jewish organizations pay occasional lip-service to the principle of Arab-Jewish cooperation, the majority of Zionist leaders are preoccupied with promoting purely Jewish enterprises from which Arabs are excluded. The minority who have taken a genuine interest in the political as well as economic and social problems of the Arab people have been denounced by their colleagues as traitors to Zionism. Nothing has yet shaken the conviction of Arabs that the real purpose of Zionism is political domination of Palestine.

Great Britain, as Mandatory for Palestine, is under obligation to conduct the affairs of the country in a manner acceptable to the conscience of the civilized world, under supervision of the League Mandates Commission. It must facilitate the development of the Jewish National Home while safeguarding the rights of the Arab population. It must also provide for the development of self-governing institutions in the territory. At the same time, the Mandatory is engaged in consolidating the strategic advantages it won in this area during the war. It has developed rapid communications with the Persian Gulf and India, and is preparing to

re-route a large part of Near Eastern trade through the new port of Haifa.

Self-governing institutions have not yet been established in Palestine. The first High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, attempted to create a Legislative Council in 1923. This attempt failed, however, because Arabs refused to cooperate in any project which did not provide for an executive responsible to a popularly elected assembly. This Great Britain could not permit because of its obligations to the Jews. Since 1923 the government of Palestine has consequently been carried on by the High Commissioner and departmental officials under the powers conferred on them by the Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922.<sup>8</sup> Draft ordinances are published in advance of promulgation to give both elements of the population an opportunity to offer comments. The measures are subsequently proclaimed, with such amendments as the administration decides to adopt. Thus, instead of a joint Arab-Jewish government assisted by British advisers, such as might have been expected under the terms of the Balfour Declaration and Article 22 of the League Covenant, there still exists in Palestine a direct British administration which accepts or rejects Arab and Jewish advice as it sees fit.

The system is admittedly unsatisfactory. Almost every measure designed to promote Arab interests is resented by the Jewish community as proof that the Mandatory is out of sympathy with Jewish enterprise. The converse is true of measures designed to meet Jewish needs. Both Arabs and Jews complain of inconstancy in administrative policies, but assiduously seek to win British support for their own desires. If, as the Mandatory asserts, there is an essential compatibility between Jewish and Arab interests in Palestine, neither Arab nor Jewish leaders have yet allowed it to emerge.

## THE SEARCH FOR A CLEARLY DEFINED POLICY

### THE SHAW REPORT

Before the 1929 disturbances Great Britain showed an increasing tendency to avoid raising controversial issues, apparently hoping that time and circumstances would gradually modify racial animosities. The Shaw Commission which investigated the causes of the disturbances concluded, however, that lack of a clear-cut program was an incentive to disorder. It urged the government to formulate a comprehensive policy, to publish its decisions in precise and unmistakable form, to make it clear that in

future no deviation from the declared policy would be tolerated, and to maintain in Palestine sufficient police and military forces to insure respect for its decisions. The majority of its members believed that Jewish enterprise and Jewish immigration, when not in excess of the absorptive capacity of the country, had conferred material benefits on Palestine, in which the Arabs had shared. Immigration had been excessive, however, and an acute land shortage had developed.<sup>9</sup> In their opinion the country could not sup-

7. *The New Judaea*, October, 1932, p. 4.

8. For text, cf. Norman Bentwich, *England in Palestine* (London, Kegan Paul, 1932), p. 318-35.

9. Mr. Harry Snell dissented from this view, believing that too much attention had been paid to exaggerated Arab fears. Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929* (Cmd. 3530, London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1930).



port a larger agricultural population until intensive cultivation had become more general. The eviction of Arab tenants as a result of land sales to Jews was creating a discontented landless class which constituted a danger to public order. It was of the utmost importance that the British government should define explicitly the relative importance it attached to its obligations toward Jews on the one hand and Arabs on the other.

The British government promptly stated that it regarded its obligations to Jews and Arabs to be of equal weight. Further than this it was not prepared to go at the moment in defining its future policy. It desired first to examine the effects of Jewish immigration and land settlement and the actual conditions prevailing among Arab cultivators. The Palestine survey was still far from complete; even in many well-populated areas the registration of land-titles had not yet taken place.<sup>10</sup> Neither were dependable estimates available as to the productive capacity of unsurveyed regions. The government required additional information, particularly with regard to agriculture. Industrial development, still occupying a secondary position in the life of the territory, involved fewer controversial issues.

In May 1930 the British government sent Sir John Hope Simpson to Palestine to conduct an investigation on which its declaration of policy might be based. Pending receipt of his report the Colonial Office suspended 2,350 labor immigration permits already promised to the Jewish Agency by the High Commissioner for the current half-year. The Zionist Organization, denouncing this measure as an obvious injustice, awaited Sir John Hope Simpson's report with the utmost misgiving.

#### THE LEAGUE'S SUGGESTIONS

The Mandates Commission in June 1930 assailed Great Britain for neglecting the interests of both Arabs and Jews. It believed that the administration should have shown more energy in promoting Jewish settlement on state and other lands. It should have given the Jews more adequate police and military protection.<sup>11</sup> It should have organized Arab agricultural, credit and cooperative societies and taught the peasants to make more profitable use of their land. It should have undertaken public works to ex-

tend the cultivable area of Palestine. This would have tended to offset the legitimate apprehensions of the Arabs in the face of a strongly organized Jewish penetration. The Commission observed that, in view of the declared objects of the mandate, the policy of the Mandatory should not aim either at crystallizing the Jewish National Home at its present stage of development or at rigidly stabilizing the government of the territory in its present form.<sup>12</sup>

#### THE HOPE SIMPSON REPORT

Sir John Hope Simpson reported that it "emerged quite definitely" that, aside from undeveloped lands held in reserve by Jewish organizations, there was at that time and with existing methods of Arab cultivation no margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants. The state possessed no large areas of vacant land which could be made available for Jewish settlement. Already the land in Arab possession was insufficient to assure cultivators a decent standard of living. Their position was desperate. They were hopelessly in debt. Rents were rising, while prices of agricultural produce were falling. Taxes were heavy, the tithe alone often amounting to 20 per cent of gross income. While their standard of living degenerated, their numbers were rapidly increasing.

Sir John Hope Simpson advocated a systematized, long-range scheme of development, aimed at intensive cultivation of the land by both Arabs and Jews. Only after years of effort, however, would this program result in a contraction of the area required by Arab cultivators and the release of a new margin of land for Jewish settlement. Meanwhile no transfers of land should be permitted which would interfere with the general development scheme or result in further displacement of Arab cultivators. Jewish immigration need not be suspended, however, since settlement could continue on land reserves held by Jewish organizations.

Small industries, he found, had increased rapidly, while larger ones had remained comparatively stationary. The latter depended chiefly on manipulation of the tariff, and imposed a burden of extra taxation on the population as a whole. He questioned the Jewish view that, as far as industry was concerned, the absorptive capacity of the country depended only on the availability of capital and labor for manufacture of marketable produce. He opposed the policy of attracting large capital to Palestine in order to start doubtful industries for the purpose

10. On evacuating Palestine the Turks had destroyed all land registers.

11. Before 1929 the Mandatory withdrew from Palestine and Transjordan all British troops except an air squadron and an armored car unit, with a total personnel of 394. The British element in the police force was limited to 173 out of a total of 1,476. The rank and file of the Transjordan Frontier Force were almost exclusively Arab, although the Zionist Organization had frequently asked for adequate Jewish representation. Report . . . on Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929, cited, p. 59-60.

12. League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the 17th (Extraordinary) Session, June 3-21, 1930*, p. 141-43, 149-52; cf. also *Official Journal*, November 1930, p. 1291-96.

of justifying an increase in the number of immigrants. In particular, he saw no reason why a large-scale textile industry should be a success in Palestine, with labor paid at rates fixed by the General Federation of Jewish Labor, while mills of Japan and Bombay, equipped with the most modern machinery and employing the cheapest of labor, were unable to find sufficient markets for their goods. The industries likely to succeed in Palestine were those based on local products or those, based on imported products, which showed special vitality.<sup>13</sup>

#### THE PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER

In October 1930, simultaneously with the Hope Simpson Report, Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies, published the long-awaited declaration of British policy in Palestine. The terms of his declaration included the following:

1. Neither Arabs nor Jews need hope to escape the limitations plainly imposed by the mandate. It was a mistake to maintain that Great Britain's obligation toward the Jewish National Home was the principal feature of the mandate, and that passages designed to safeguard rights of non-Jews were merely secondary considerations. Neither obligation should be subordinated to the other.

2. A Legislative Council must be created with both elected and official members.

3. A more methodical agricultural development was necessary, since the Arab population was rapidly increasing and areas formerly available for its sustenance were passing into Jewish hands, after which they were strictly barred to Arab labor.

4. Control of immigration must be improved. The Mandatory must be the deciding authority in immigration policy. The economic capacity of the country to absorb new immigrants must be judged in relation to unemployment in Palestine as a whole. If immigration of Jews prevented the Arab population from obtaining the work necessary for its maintenance or if Jewish unemployment unfavorably affected the general labor position, then the Mandatory must reduce or suspend immigration.<sup>14</sup>

The Passfield declaration, couched in language not uniformly urbane, aroused unprecedented expressions of anger in Jewish communities throughout the world, where the sympathies of even habitual indifferentists had been drawn to the Jewish National Home by a widespread and successful appeal for funds to aid victims of the 1929 disturbances.<sup>15</sup> Dr. Weizmann, noted for his moderation, resigned from the

presidency of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency on the ground that the newly announced policy would crystallize the Jewish National Home at its present stage of development.<sup>16</sup> In the United States, Jewish leaders threatened to organize an anti-British campaign to surpass in effectiveness the Sinn Fein movement of former years. General Smuts cabled from South Africa that the Balfour Declaration was an international agreement which could not be modified by unilateral British action. Mr. Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Amery stated in a joint letter to *The Times* that the White Paper seemed to be in conflict with previous British commitments and the instructions of the League Council. Mr. Winston Churchill declared that a change of emphasis was required in the document to bring it into harmony with former pronouncements. Lord Hailsham and Sir John Simon suggested that disputed paragraphs of the statements should be held in abeyance pending an advisory opinion from the World Court.<sup>17</sup>

In the face of this barrage of criticism the British government maintained that the White Paper had been both misinterpreted and misrepresented. It denied that the document was a retreat from previous commitments. Instead it was an attempt to meet the view of the Mandates Commission that the Arabs should receive more aid in adapting themselves to the consequences of Jewish enterprise.<sup>18</sup>

The official criticisms published by the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency included the following features:

1. Sir John Hope Simpson's report was defective. He had underestimated the cultivable area of Palestine and overestimated the pressure upon it of the rural Arab population. The Passfield declaration was therefore based on faulty premises.

2. It was not necessary in the interests of Arab tenants or landowners to restrict or prohibit Jewish land purchase, nor was there any economic justification for it.

3. State lands were now earmarked for settlement of landless Arabs, whereas the mandate had suggested that Jews should enjoy prior consideration in allotment of such areas.

4. The White Paper attempted to establish an unjustifiable connection between Jewish immigration and the Arab labor market. If further immigration restrictions were enforced on this account, investments of private Jewish capital in Palestine would cease.

5. The White Paper failed to bring out the

13. Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Palestine. Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development* (Cmd. 3686, London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1930).

14. Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Palestine. Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, October, 1930* (Cmd. 3692, London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1930).

15. In the disturbances 133 Jews were killed and 339 injured, and there was considerable property damage. The Palestine Emergency Fund totaled £606,558. Cf. Jewish Agency, *Memorandum on the Development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine in 1932*, p. 47-48.

16. Dr. Weizmann was joined in his resignation by the late Lord Melchett, Chairman of the Council of the Jewish Agency, and Mr. Felix Warburg, Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the Agency. For statements by Dr. Weizmann, cf. *The Times*, October 21, 1930, p. 16; October 31, p. 13.

17. *Ibid.*, October 22, 23, 27, and November 4, 1930; also S. S. Wise and J. de Haas, *The Great Betrayal* (New York, Brentano, 1930).

18. *The Times*, October 27, 1930, p. 11; November 6, p. 15; House of Commons, *Debates*, Fifth Series, vol. 244, col. 24, October 28, 1930.

true nature of Sir John Hope Simpson's constructive proposals and its spirit was not that of a government seriously interested in the Jewish National Home. Its criticism of the exclusion of Arab labor from Jewish holdings showed a misunderstanding of the national and social requirements of Jewish colonization.

6. The declaration tended to reduce the Mandatory's obligations toward world Jewry to a mere obligation toward the Jews in Palestine.<sup>19</sup>

The Palestine Arab Executive was equally opposed to the Passfield policy, since it denied Palestine a responsible form of government and since one aim of the development scheme was to release more land for Jewish settlement.<sup>20</sup>

### THE MACDONALD INTERPRETATION

To meet the avalanche of criticism at home and abroad, the British Prime Minister, Mr. J. Ramsay MacDonald, arranged for a series of conferences between Jewish leaders and a subcommittee of the Cabinet, as a result of which he published on February 13, 1931 an authoritative interpretation of the Passfield White Paper in a letter to Dr. Weizmann.<sup>21</sup> By the Jews, the Arabs and the Mandates Commission this was regarded as a definite withdrawal from the Passfield policy on several important points.<sup>22</sup> Dr. Weizmann welcomed it as re-establishing a basis of cooperation with the Mandatory.

Mr. MacDonald promised that an inquiry would be undertaken to discover what state lands could be used for close settlement by the Jews. This was an admission that reliance was no longer placed on the Hope Simpson estimates assailed by the Zionist Organization.<sup>23</sup> The "landless" Arabs to be settled on state lands were narrowly defined to include a much more limited group than Zionists had originally feared. The Prime Minister promised, moreover, that there would be as little interference as possible with the free transfer of land. He dwelt on the positive benefits the development project would bring to both Jews and Arabs. The tone of his letter was friendly toward the Jewish National Home. He promised that the government would consider the Jewish claim to a share of employment on public works commensurate with Jewish contributions to public revenue. He withdrew the

challenge of the Jewish Agency's right to exclude Arab labor from Jewish enterprises. He pointed out, however, that if this resulted in displacement of Arab labor or aggravation of existing unemployment, the Mandatory would be bound to shape its immigration policy accordingly. He undertook, furthermore, that immigrants would not be barred for inability to prove that the work they had in view was to be of unlimited duration. Only in the case of employment of a purely ephemeral nature need they fear exclusion.

Other features of the Passfield White Paper were reasserted in the MacDonald-Weizmann letter. In particular, it pointed out that proposals for ameliorating Arab conditions of life did not imply placing a limit on Jewish aspirations. Until Jews and Arabs came to an understanding with each other, the balancing of their interests would always have to be considered in British definitions of policy.

### THE FRENCH REPORTS

Mr. Lewis French was appointed Director of Development in July 1931 to outline the comprehensive program foreshadowed in the Passfield White Paper. He issued two reports on development and land settlement,<sup>24</sup> confirming in many respects the pessimistic views of Sir John Hope Simpson, although these had been rejected by the Jewish Agency, questioned by the Mandates Commission and quietly dropped by the British government. The French reports were pervaded with a sense of the congestion already existing in cultivable areas in Palestine. There were no state lands available for the settlement of either Jews or landless Arabs. For the latter the government would therefore have to expropriate lands now under extensive cultivation, spending five or six years preparing them for intensive cultivation, at considerable expense.<sup>25</sup> Further displacement of Arab cultivators must be prevented. Tenants must be protected from eviction and peasant proprietors obliged to retain enough land for their own subsistence.<sup>26</sup>

Hydrographic and irrigation surveys were of the utmost importance, and government control of water distribution should be established. Without the discovery of further

19. Zionist Organization, *Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization Submitted at the 17th Zionist Congress at Basle, 1931*, p. 42-43, 173-75; *Jewish Agency Memorandum, 1930* (covering letter of Dr. Weizmann to High Commissioner in Palestine). Cf. also *The New Judaea*, November 1930; L. Stein, *The Palestine White Paper of October 1930*, Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1930; *The Statistical Bases of Sir John Hope Simpson's Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development in Palestine*, Jewish Agency for Palestine.

20. Mandates Commission, *Minutes, 20th Session*, p. 223.

21. House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 248, col. 751 ff; quoted also in F. F. Andrews, *The Holy Land under Mandate* (New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1931), vol. II, p. 394.

22. *Zionist Executive Report, 17th Congress*, cited, p. 174-75; Mandates Commission, *Minutes, 20th Session*, p. 78-80, 230.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 74-75, 90.

24. Government of Palestine, *Reports on Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine*, by Lewis French (December 23, 1931 and April 20, 1932; London, Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1933).

25. Estimated at £800 per family. Under the strict regulations adopted by the tribunal concerned, only 889 "landless" families were registered before July 1933 out of a total of over 3,000 applicants. House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 280, col. 1439. The Jewish Agency pointed out that the Shaw and Hope Simpson reports had greatly exaggerated the problem of displacement. *Jewish Agency Memorandum, 1932*, cited (covering letter to High Commissioner).

26. Peasant proprietors were selling out rapidly not only to Jews but to wealthy Arab landowners. At the present rate of progress the peasant class in Palestine would be extinct in less than half a century. *French Reports*, cited, p. 19-20, 77-78.



water resources both rural and urban development would be seriously restricted, and existing citrus cultivation might have to be drastically curtailed. Mr. French warned the government that the foreign markets now in view were inadequate to absorb the increased output from maturing groves. Should the orange market collapse under the pressure of rapidly advancing production, the rural population would be left without an alternative source of income. For the concentrated haste of Jewish development policy, his entire statement suggested the substitution of more deliberate and less spectacular achievements. He appeared to doubt the permanency of any other type of development.

The French reports were rejected in 1932 by the Jewish Agency and the Palestine Arab Executive. On July 14, 1933 they were tardily published, however, and the government announced to the House of Commons the details of an immediate development program, to be financed out of a £2,000,000 loan guaranteed by Great Britain. The specific items included in this program were as follows:

Resettlement of displaced Arabs (to be a first charge on the funds); new water-

supply and drainage schemes for Jerusalem and Haifa; a water supply for Hebron; improvement of water supplies in villages; a hydrographic survey; a new post office and telephone exchange for Jerusalem; construction of new school buildings; an oil export dock at Haifa; government participation in a scheme for long-term loans to Arab and Jewish agriculturists, with special appropriations for loans to Arab cultivators in the hill districts. Improvement of the port of Jaffa would be financed out of funds provided from the balance of the 1926 loan.<sup>27</sup>

To this specific initial program the Jewish Agency objected that the principles of simultaneity and parity in allocation of development funds ought to be observed as between activities intended for the benefit of Arabs and Jews respectively. To Jewish agriculture should be devoted precisely the same amount which was to be spent on resettlement of displaced Arab cultivators, since Jewish contributions to public revenues would amount to at least 50 per cent of the whole budget during the period covered by service of the £2,000,000 loan.<sup>28</sup> The Jewish Agency listed a number of public works urgently needed in Jewish settlements.<sup>29</sup>

### THE APPLICATION OF BRITISH POLICY

The four-year period of analysis and planning in Palestine did not have the precise results anticipated by the Shaw Commission. The feasibility of the general program finally evolved was still a matter for conjecture. The immediate development project was limited to a few outstanding necessities, most of them recognized even before any formal inquiries were undertaken. The Mandatory had not yet dispelled the impression that it was responsive to outside pressure. Variability was still a feature of its policy. Maneuvering for position by Arabs and Jews aggravated the existing racial conflict.

#### IMMIGRATION

The focal point of the Arab-Jewish conflict was the immigration question. Until 1923 the average rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine was about 7,000 a year. Economic depression in Poland forced it up to a sudden peak of over 33,000 in 1925. This stimulated a Palestinian boom in the building and retail trades, which was followed immediately by a slump reflected in a sudden

and drastic reduction of immigration. In 1927 only 2,713 Jews settled in the country, while almost twice as many left it. Not until 1932 did Jewish immigration regain earlier levels. In 1933 a second spectacular influx occurred, reaching—according to Zionist statements—a record total of 38,000.<sup>30</sup> The rate for 1934 continues at a phenomenally high level.<sup>31</sup>

The suddenness of this second increase, even more spectacular than that of 1925, forced the British authorities to bear in mind the possibility of a second depression in Palestine, accompanied by another and perhaps more serious outbreak of Arab violence against the Jews. In an effort to keep immigration from exceeding the limit which the country could absorb without untoward after-effects, they adopted a policy extremely distasteful to the Jewish Agency. They scaled down the Jewish Agency's semi-annual forecasts of the amount of labor immigration required<sup>32</sup>—this being the only

27. House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 280, col. 1440.

28. In 1932 government investigators placed Jewish contributions to ordinary public revenues at 36.6 per cent, entitling Jewish labor to a corresponding proportion of employment on public works. Arabs made light of Jewish claims to special consideration on the score of their disproportionately heavy contributions to public funds, pointing out that more than one-third of the budget was required for public defense—i.e., the protection of the Jewish National Home from attack by its unwilling hosts.

29. *Zionist Executive Report*, 18th Congress, cited, p. 197-99, 216-20.

30. *New York Times*, April 19, 1934. For immigration and emigration in previous years, cf. Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan*, 1932 (Colonial No. 82, London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1933), p. 153; *Shaw Report*, cited, p. 101; *Jewish Agency Memorandum*, 1932, cited, p. 6.

31. For categories of immigrants, cf. *Administration of Palestine and Transjordan*, 1932, cited, p. 25; *The Palestine Gazette*, July 31, 1933.

32. In October 1932, 6,760 were claimed and 4,500 granted; in April 1933, 12,750 claimed and 5,500 granted; in October 1933, 25,000 claimed and 5,500 granted. Cf. *Zionist Executive Report*, 18th Congress, cited, p. 209; *New York Times*, October 29, 1933.



category to which a quota is applied. They took the view that it would be disastrous to relax all ordinary restrictions in favor of German Jewish refugees.<sup>33</sup> Finally, in October 1933, the High Commissioner announced a campaign against illegal Jewish immigration. This led to the arrest, and in many cases the deportation, of numbers of Jews who had either evaded boundary control or entered the country as tourists and settled down without permission.

The Jewish Agency did not anticipate a serious depression following the sudden rise in immigration in 1933 and 1934. It hoped that the peculiar nature of Jewish interest in Palestine would offset influences which might otherwise have operated in favor of a disastrous reaction.<sup>34</sup> An unusually large proportion of recent immigrants had been entrepreneurs forced out of business in other countries, attracted to Palestine by the absence of an income tax and in many cases by favorable exchange rates as well. Small industries had sprung up and were flourishing. In 1925 Palestine had still been regarded chiefly as an object of philanthropic endeavor; now it was esteemed as a secure and profitable channel for investment.<sup>35</sup> The prohibitive tariffs erected throughout the world in the name of economic nationalism constituted a menace which Zionist leaders did not ignore. They hoped, therefore, that Great Britain would reverse its decision to exclude Palestinian products from the benefits of Empire preference. Meanwhile economic activity in Palestine, based on enterprises of unquestioned usefulness, developed with remarkable vigor. There was practically no unemployment.<sup>35a</sup>

The Jewish Agency came into sharpest conflict with the High Commissioner over the administration's failure to admit to the country all who desired to come. The needs of refugees from Germany were acute. Palestine required and could easily absorb a much greater immigration. Jewish immigration was undoubtedly the determining factor in Palestine's prosperity, enabling the government to accumulate a surplus in the treasury at a time when other countries

were piling up deficits.<sup>36</sup> If Great Britain blocked immigration, the conclusion must be drawn that it was no longer regulating the flow in accordance with the economic needs of the country. The Jewish Agency's forecasts of labor requirements were based on careful investigations, and the administration had no right to scale them down without explaining why they were deemed to be incorrect. The fact that tourists were settling in Palestine proved that the administration had underestimated the absorptive capacity of the country. Deportation was an excessive punishment for illegal domicile. Unauthorized immigrants were an enterprising class of people who made excellent settlers. If the government continued to deport them, the Jewish Agency would protest against the constant influx of Arabs from Transjordan, of whom no record whatever was kept.<sup>37</sup> By retarding immigration Great Britain was inviting collapse of growing industries unable to secure necessary labor.

In October 1933, when the increasing momentum of Jewish immigration began seriously to alarm Arab leaders, nationalist and youth organizations arranged a series of demonstrations against British policy. These were prohibited by the authorities on the ground that no political processions had been allowed since the outbreak of 1929. The organizers continued with their plans, however, and assured the Arab public that the processions would be peaceful and that there would be no risk in participating in them. In actual fact 27 were killed and 243 wounded. The High Commissioner assumed emergency powers. The inauguration of Haifa harbor on October 31 took place behind barbed wire entanglements under heavy guard, with the briefest of ceremonies, previous arrangements for an extended celebration having been cancelled. A general Arab strike continued from October 29 to November 3.

Arab leaders held the police responsible for the bloodshed which occurred at Jaffa and elsewhere.<sup>38</sup> They still pressed for the

33. House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 276, col. 142 (April 3, 1933). Certain minor concessions, however, were made for the convenience of German Jews but no one has claimed that these affected the general problem to any important degree. Cf. *Zionist Executive Report, 18th Congress*, cited, p. 214.

34. *Jewish Agency Memorandum*, 1932, cited (covering letter to High Commissioner).

35. *Zionist Executive Report, 18th Congress*, cited, p. 337. One-fifth of the Jewish population is engaged in agriculture, one-fifth in trade, and 30 per cent in industry. Recent immigrants have added to the 265 types of industry found in Palestine at the time of the 1931 census. Since 70 per cent of Moslem Arabs are engaged in agriculture, Jews have met with industrial competition by Palestinian Arabs in only a very limited degree. For figures, cf. Bentwich, *Palestine*, cited, p. 25.

35a. Officially estimated to be 400 Jews and 14,000 Arabs. Cf. House of Lords, *Debates*, vol. 93, col. 197-98, June 27, 1934. Arabs expect 45,000 of their own number to be unemployed as soon as harvest is over. *The Arab Federation*, July 7, 1934.

36. In 1930 there was a deficit of £46,959; in 1931 a deficit of £40,972; in the first three months of 1932 a surplus of £145,633; from April 1932 to March 1933 a surplus of £499,623. House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 281, col. 909, November 7, 1933.

37. *Zionist Executive Report, 18th Congress*, cited, p. 210; *New York Times*, November 16, 1933; *Oriente Moderno*, November 1933, p. 570. Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, a strong supporter of the Jewish National Home, asserted in the House of Commons on November 29, 1933 that 20,000 unauthorized Jewish immigrants were living in Palestine. House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 283, col. 865. In 1931, 3,258 unauthorized Jewish immigrants were formally registered as permanent residents and in 1932, 3,730, in addition to 719 Christians and 109 Moslems. *Administration of Palestine and Transjordan, 1931*, cited, p. 21; 1932, p. 26.

38. Active military intervention had not been required. The Murlison-Trusted report on the disturbances, based on secret hearings, exonerated the police from charges of having acted without restraint. It pointed out that the proximity of Jewish settlements to the scenes of disturbance laid a heavy responsibility on the police, whose duty it was to prevent development of race riots. For text, cf. *The Palestine Gazette*, February 7, 1934.

right to hold peaceful demonstrations. To the astonishment of the Jewish Agency this right was eventually granted, being exercised on January 17, 1934 in a number of centers without untoward incident.<sup>39</sup>

#### LAND REGIME

Land acquired by Jews in Palestine totaled about 325,000 acres in 1932.<sup>40</sup> Relatively little has been added since that date. It falls into two categories—that held by the Jewish National Fund (74,227 acres<sup>41</sup>), which is the inalienable property of the Jewish people, and that acquired by a variety of companies, societies and individuals. Land for which the Jewish National Fund possesses the title may never be held by a non-Jew, and non-Jewish labor is perpetually barred from it.<sup>42</sup> In the case of other land acquired by Zionists the principle of employing only Jewish labor is also observed, since it is the aim of Zionism to create in Palestine a self-contained Jewish community “performing the manifold kinds of manual work which naturally form part of a people’s every-day life.”<sup>43</sup> Constant pressure has been exerted on non-Zionist Jewish colonies to employ none but Jewish labor. By persuasion and intimidation, including picketing of groves, the proportion of Arab workers has been gradually reduced in these colonies, where they have been habitually employed since pre-war days.<sup>44</sup>

Arab nationalist leaders organized a campaign against land sales to Jews to check the process of alienation. Four factors militated, however, against the success of their campaign—the financial embarrassment of many Arab landowners, the high prices obtainable from Jewish buyers, the inadequate returns from land still under the indifferent management of Arab cultivators, and the persistent rumor that certain nationalist leaders were themselves arranging land sales to Jews.<sup>45</sup> The Arab Executive, therefore, pressed unavailingly for legislation prohibiting land sales to Jews. Then, some-

what tardily, they decided to fight the Jewish National Fund with its own weapon. In September 1932 an Arab National Fund was organized with an initial capital of \$10,000 to acquire and develop land offered for sale by Arab owners.<sup>46</sup> The Supreme Moslem Council, moreover, encouraged the transformation of Arab-owned land into *waqf* property,<sup>47</sup> to prevent it in perpetuity from falling into Jewish hands.

The scarcity of available land in Palestine and its increasing cost, made higher than ever by the operations of Jewish brokers and speculators from 1932 onward,<sup>48</sup> naturally encouraged Jewish leaders to turn their attention to Transjordan, from which Jewish immigration is still barred by the British Mandatory. Here ruinous droughts and the spectacle of successful Jewish agricultural enterprise in Palestine led a group of Arab sheikhs in 1932 to solicit Jewish aid in developing their property. The prospect of such expansion was most welcome to Zionist leaders, but the Legislative Assembly of Transjordan obstructed it by adopting a bill designed to prevent sale or lease of land to Jews.<sup>49</sup> A British representative informed the Mandates Commission that his government did not consider it possible to facilitate Jewish settlement in Transjordan at present. There was nothing, however, to prevent Jews from financing a transfer of Palestinian Arabs to Transjordan, if the number transferred was not greater than Transjordan could absorb.<sup>50</sup> No such program has been announced by the Zionists, although it is frequently advocated in private circles.

Meanwhile, during the period 1931-1933 the authorities continued to introduce new measures to fortify the position of Arab cultivators in Palestine.<sup>51</sup> The Jewish Agency complained that these encouraged Arab leaders to put forward fictitious claims on behalf of individuals having no real stake in the land—either for political purposes, to

46. *Ibid.*; also December 1932, p. 592; June 1934, p. 288.

47. “A *waqf* is a transfer of ownership to the Deity for a purpose which is, or may become, charitable or religious.” *Hope Simpson Report*, cited, p. 30. Sir John Hope Simpson estimated that the area of *waqf* lands in 1930 was considerably less than 25,000 acres. By April 1934 7,500 acres of land in the Tulkarm district were transformed into *waqf* property. *Oriente Moderno*, February 1934, p. 81; *The Arab Federation* (Jerusalem), April 25, 1934.

48. For an official denunciation of the practices of speculators, which prevented Jews from acquiring as much land from the Arabs as they otherwise might have done, cf. *Zionist Executive Report*, 18th Congress, p. 116, 129.

49. *Oriente Moderno*, May 1933, p. 255; February 1934, p. 84.

50. Mandates Commission, *Minutes*, 23rd Session (June 1933), p. 98.

51. These included (a) an ordinance of 1931 to preserve the status of tenants in case of mortgage foreclosures; (b) an ordinance of 1931 prohibiting imprisonment for debt, except where ability to pay could be proved; (c) a land disputes ordinance of 1932 permitting intervention of district commissioners to settle disputes between Jewish landowners and former occupants of land; (d) a protection of cultivators ordinance in September 1933, aimed at the practice of certain Arab landowners who had been clearing their land of tenants before arranging a sale in order to escape the expense of providing for their tenants elsewhere. The ordinance prohibited eviction of tenants of one year’s standing except for non-payment of rent or neglect of the land. *Oriente Moderno*, September 1933, p. 463-64.

39. *Oriente Moderno*, February 1934, p. 78.

40. J. Elazari-Volcani, “Jewish Colonization in Palestine,” *The Annals*, cited, November 1932, p. 84.

41. By the end of 1932 the Jewish National Fund had spent £2,048,736 on the acquisition and development of land; 67.2 per cent of this was for rural land. *Zionist Executive Report*, 18th Congress, p. 116-17, 122; *Administration of Palestine and Transjordan*, 1932, cited, p. 22.

42. Constitution of Jewish Agency, 1929, article 3(d). Cf. *Jewish Agency Memorandum*, 1929, p. 38.

43. Dr. Arlosoroff, quoted in *Hope Simpson Report*, cited, p. 127.

44. *Zionist Executive Report*, 18th Congress, p. 274, 281-82. Frequent criticism of this policy has been voiced in Western countries on the ground that it will necessarily prevent the development of cordial Arab-Jewish relations and force the two groups irrevocably into the rôle of economic competitors. Cf. “A Note on One Cause of the Recent Disturbances in Palestine,” *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, vol. XXI, Part I, January 1934, p. 129; Sir Andrew McFadyen, “Immigration and Labor in Palestine,” *Foreign Affairs* (New York), July 1934, p. 682.

45. In October 1932 Arab nationalists appointed a committee of three to investigate these charges, but the latter have never been effectively refuted nor have any persons been disciplined for what is generally branded as treachery in Arab circles. *Oriente Moderno*, November 1932, p. 541.

hamper land purchases by Jews, or else with a view to extorting compensation where none was due.<sup>52</sup> Arab capitalists objected, on the other hand, that protection of tenant cultivators had been pushed to such an extreme that it would encourage landowners to leave large tracts uncultivated wherever there was hope of ultimate sale to Jews.<sup>53</sup>

To relieve the peasants permanently of a burden of taxation which they are unable to meet and which in practice has had to be remitted year after year, the administration advanced proposals in 1933 for an income tax to be levied on business and professional classes. The suggestion met with guarded approval in Arab circles but caused deep concern among Jewish business men, who objected that such a tax would be difficult to collect, would penalize the more advanced sections of the population, would check the flow of capital to Palestine, and was in any case unnecessary. The Jewish Agency asserted that it would prefer to go on supporting separate health and educational services for the Jewish community rather than see an additional part of Jewish resources flow into an exchequer over which they had no control and from which they were not likely to receive a proportionate return.<sup>54</sup> A commission spent some months studying the feasibility of an income tax measure. To deal, meanwhile, with the cognate and even more pressing problem of peasant indebtedness to usurers, the government appointed a Registrar of Cooperative Societies in 1932,<sup>55</sup> but has as yet adopted no measures to scale down the preposterous totals of nominal debts.

### SELF-GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS

From time to time the proposal has been heard that Palestine should be divided into autonomous Jewish and Arab cantons, each with its own legislature. This would satisfy the desire of both for the control of their own public affairs and provide a basis for

positive, acceptable and effective administrative measures appropriate to the needs of each.<sup>57</sup> Zionists oppose the suggestion because it would place limits on the development of the Jewish National Home. Arabs oppose it because it would irrevocably establish Jewish political rights in Palestine. Neither does the British government sponsor the project. The Mandatory is preparing, instead, to set up the central Legislative Council foreshadowed in the Passfield White Paper. This innovation will not imply introduction of responsible government, which would undoubtedly bring racial conflicts to an immediate crisis, but will merely provide the various sections of the population with regular opportunities to express their views. Effective control of legislation will still be retained by the British authorities.<sup>58</sup> Neither Jews nor Arabs have shown the slightest inclination to cooperate in the venture.

The government has approached this modest beginning in representative institutions by two stages. In 1930, 1931 and 1932 it appointed non-official Arab and Jewish members to various government committees. The experiment proved highly successful until a general non-cooperation movement in 1932 led a number of Arab appointees to resign. The second step was the promulgation in January 1934 of a Municipal Corporations Ordinance under whose terms citizens prepared to elect their own local representatives for the first time since 1927. The ordinance accentuated the tendency of the central government to absorb functions exercised in Turkish times by democratically organized local bodies.<sup>59</sup> Its object was to increase the efficiency of local administrations and guarantee sound economic development. For thirteen months before its promulgation Jewish and Arab municipal bodies united in opposing the measure, but were unsuccessful in obtaining any extension of the initiative of local authorities.<sup>60</sup>

### CONCLUSION

In the past four years Arab and Jewish nationalisms have become at once more intense and more difficult to keep in check. "Sooner or later," writes a well-known resident of the country, "both sides will have to realize that they are destined to live and work together in Palestine. Then negotia-

tions for a delimitation of their respective rights and reciprocal duties will have better prospect of success than at present."<sup>61</sup> For the moment, however, this eventuality is not the ideal which the majority of either Arab or Jewish leaders have in mind.

52. *Zionist Executive Report, 18th Congress*, p. 240; *Jewish Agency Memorandum*, 1932, cited, covering letter to High Commissioner.

53. *Oriente Moderno*, October 1933, p. 520.

54. *Zionist Executive Report, 18th Congress*, p. 237-39, 341.

55. As suggested by Mr. C. F. Strickland in *Government of Palestine, Report on the Possibility of Introducing a System of Agricultural Cooperation in Palestine* (London, Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1930).

57. For recent proposals, cf. *Oriente Moderno*, February 1934, p. 79-80; D. Duff, "The Mandates in Syria and Palestine," *Quarterly Review*, January 1933.

58. House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 283, col. 259-60.

59. For excellent articles on this subject, cf. I. Ben-Zvi, "Local Autonomy in Palestine," and O. S. al-Barghuthi, "Local Self-Government—Past and Present," in *The Annals*, November 1932, p. 27-38; also Bentwich, *England in Palestine*, cited.

60. *Oriente Moderno*, October 1933, p. 519; February 1934, p. 83-84.

61. A. Ruppin, *The Jews in the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1934), p. 399.



The Zionist movement has already achieved a considerable degree of positive success. It is intensely anxious to place the Jewish National Home in an unassailable position, without further delay, through greatly increased immigration. In this it is blocked, however, by the policy of the British administration. A people unquestionably capable of self-government, they are increasingly irked by their compulsory subordination to the control of their British sponsors, necessitated by the fact that they are not the only inhabitants of Palestine and because they are completely dependent on Great Britain for military protection. Their impatience was never so marked as during the period between August 1929 and February 1931, when Arab violence, the Shaw and Hope Simpson reports and the Passfield declaration of policy seemed to indicate that the Mandatory was at least indifferent to the Jewish National Home and perhaps regretted its undertakings toward the Zionists. In 1931 Dr. Weizmann was ousted from leadership of the Zionist organization on the ground that his policy of combined moderation and cooperation had not yielded satisfactory results. The World Zionist Organization has since then shown a determination to present a more unyielding front toward the Mandatory. Meanwhile, however, it has had to deal with a rebellious tendency on the part of left-wing Revisionists, whose strength has been increasing in Palestine in the last two years. The Revisionists contend that Jews should assert their claim to political dominance and independence in Palestine, and that they should use every means, including military force, to achieve this end.<sup>61a</sup>

Arab nationalism has also made marked gains during the period under review. The Passfield White Paper and the Shaw, Hope Simpson and French reports fortified it with cogent, up-to-date and widely published arguments on which the Arabs might rest their case. In flattering, if tentative, belated and amateur fashion, they began to emulate their Jewish competitors in such matters as the collection of funds, the purchase of lands, the establishment of banks, the holding of an annual fair to demonstrate the variety of purely Arab industries, and in their plans for the founding of a Moslem University in Jerusalem. To counter-balance the advantages enjoyed by Zionists on account of their wide international affiliations, the Arabs founded in December 1931 a General Moslem Conference, with headquarters in Jerusalem and branches scattered throughout the greater part of the Moslem world. One of its objects was to

awaken Moslems generally to their duty toward the sacred territory of Palestine, now threatened by a Jewish invasion. In some centres, as in Bombay, the response to appeals for funds was all that Palestinian leaders could have desired. Further support for their ambitions, moreover, was provided by the pan-Arab movement, which gained new vitality when Iraq was emancipated from the mandate system in 1932.

Although the Shaw Commission suggested that a less variable and more clearly defined British policy might ameliorate Arab-Jewish relations, a certain indefiniteness still clings to it. The blame for this is cast on the disputants. Officials rebuke the Arabs for not surrendering their fundamental position and the Zionists for not being more considerate of Arab susceptibilities in lesser matters. There is, however, a more lively sense of the possibility of general disorder in Palestine. The British element in the police force has been quadrupled; two battalions of British infantry have been stationed in the country and an extra squadron has been assigned to the air force. The security of outlying Jewish colonies has been improved by the construction of all-weather roads and by the provision of telephonic communication and signalling apparatus where these were necessary.

Great Britain apparently has no very lively fear of a general attack on the Jewish National Home by Palestinian Arabs in alliance with Arabs of neighboring countries.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, it does not consider it prudent to inflame Arab sensibilities by admitting as many immigrants as the Jewish Agency desires. Many British officials believe with Sir Herbert Samuel that Palestine is capable of supporting a population of 3,000,000, or three times its present total.<sup>63</sup> They do not propose, however, to proceed too hastily or to invite an artificial boom if it can be avoided. The professions are already overcrowded. To make room for a considerable expansion of Jewish agricultural enterprise will require time. In the industrial field there is room for more immediate expansion, but this must go hand in hand with the opening up of new markets. Pending the discovery of such markets by those who require them, the authorities have therefore fallen back on a non-committal policy, designed to preserve a rough balance between the hopes and disappointments of both Jews and Arabs.

62. The Shaw Commission warned the government that the results of such an attack would be "incalculable." *Shaw Report*, p. 76. Arab nationalist leaders show a marked hopefulness whenever the European press discusses the possibility of another general European conflict, which might conceivably engross British attention sufficiently to permit an Arab rising to have some effect.

63. For considerably larger populations supported in Palestine in ancient times, cf. Jacob de Haas, *History of Palestine: The Last Two Thousand Years* (New York, Macmillan, 1934), *passim*.

61a. Smuggling of arms into Palestine by Jews is becoming increasingly common. Many openly assert that they are preparing themselves to meet a possible contingency.